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HAS THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION?
arbiter nihil extra compromissumfacere potest ...
Justinian, Digest 4.8.32.21
OnJanuary 18, 1985,1 the United States notified the International Court
of Justice of its withdrawal from the proceedings in the Case concerning Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.2 In its notice, the United
States alleged that "the Court lacks jurisdiction and competence." It con-
tended that "the Court's decision of November 26, 1984, finding that it has
jurisdiction, is contrary to law and fact." 3 The allegation invokes a venerable
tradition in international arbitration and adjudication about the conse-
quences of the exercise of excess jurisdiction by an international tribunal.4
I.
International tribunals are bodies of limited competence, empowered to
adjudicate only those matters which have been submitted to them by the
parties and only in the manner prescribed by their constitutive documents.'
When an international tribunal purports to act beyond the authority granted
to it, its acts, like those of any other entity that exceeds its authority, are
null and void. Practice and scholarship have developed and refined an item-
ization of grounds for nullification.6
' U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, Department
Statement, Jan. 18, 1985, DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2096, March 1985, at 64.
2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
3 Department statement, supra note 1, at 64.
4 See generally K. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946); A.
BALASKO, CAUSES DE NULLIT- DE LA SENTENCE ARBITRALE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
(1938); J. WITENBERG, L'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE, LA PROC9DURE ET LA SENTENCE INTER-
NATIONALE (1937); W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (197 1).
' Classic statements were made in Mavrommatis, where Lord Finlay said, "The jurisdiction
of the Permanent Court rests upon consent, and without consent there is no jurisdiction over
any State." Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 PCIJ, ser. A, No. 2, at 42 (diss. op. L.
Finlay, J.). In the same case, Judge Moore stated:
Ever mindful of the fact that their judgments, if rendered in excess of power, may be
treated as null, international tribunals have universally regarded the question ofjurisdiction
as fundamental.. . The international judicial tribunals so far created have been tribunals
of limited powers. Therefore no presumption in favor of their jurisdiction may be indulged.
Their jurisdiction must always affirmatively appear on the face of the record.
Id. at 60 (diss. op. Moore, J.).
6 In addition to the citations in note 4 supra, see Commentary on the Draft Convention on
Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifth Session, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/92, at 105-10 (1955) (UN Pub. Sales No. 1955.V.1).
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The practical problem in international law in implementing this elemen-
tary legal notion has been the general lack of political or judicial hierarchy.
Hierarchies might supply another instance to review the assertion by the
aggrieved party that the original tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction.
Without such a reviewing authority, there is the fear that the evil of excs de
pouvoir will be more than matched by the evil ofjudex in sua causa.
Despite such concerns, it cannot be questioned that the demand for respect
for constitutive instruments and, perforce, the sanction for violation of that
respect prevail. The point can be demonstrated by examining a provision
such as Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court (which is
essentially declaratory of international arbitration law) and the way inter-
national law construes it. Article 36(6) provides: "In the event of a dispute
as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the
decision of the Court." Given the care and detail manifested by the preceding
five paragraphs of Article 36 and the comparable care heretofore applied
by the Permanent Court and the International Court in construing them,
it would be absurd to contend that paragraph 6 empowers the Court to
decide without regard to the law in question. The very word "Court" imports
a decision based on the legal expectations of the parties, not on some judicial
cadenza.
Any possible doubt about international legal thinking on this matter was
dispelled when the General Assembly of the United Nations reviewed the
International Law Commission's Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure
in 1952.' The French version of Article 11, corresponding to Article 36(6)
of the Statute of the International Court, described the tribunal "as the
'maitre' of its own competence" and attributed to it "the widest powers to
interpret the conpromis." The Assembly objected to the breadth of that as-
cription8 and the Commission subsequently changed "maitre de sa competence"
to 'juge de sa competence" and excluded the word "widest." 9 Rather than
injuring international arbitration and adjudication, both the Commission
and the General Assembly thus made a substantial contribution to the ef-
fectiveness of international arbitration. For, as the commentary to the draft
put it:
It is not the fact alone that the compromis may provide that the award
is binding on the parties which makes it so binding. The view of States
that international law makes an arbitration award binding, the circum-
stance that the tribunal faithfully has adhered to the fundamental prin-
ciples of law governing its proceedings, these are the ultimate sources
of the binding authority of an international arbitral award. States are
required to take all necessary measures to carry into effect an award
so rendered.' 0
In the final analysis, it is law that is the major factor in enforceability.
7 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 7, UN Doc. A/2163 (1952).
I. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN JURIS-
DICTION: COMPETENCE DE LA COMPETENCE 11 (1965).
9 See [1958] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 43-46, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958; for a concise
summary of the debate, see I. SHIHATA, supra note 8, at 11 and n.4.
"o Commentary, supra note 6, at 105.
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The late Professor Scelle, the rapporteur of the projet, though rebuked
on this point, was hardly insensitive to the problem of excess ofjurisdiction.
He included a provision and a procedure for it in the projet.1 The com-
mentary prepared by the Secretariat observed:
An international tribunal is not a court of general jurisdiction nor
is it a court free from the established rules of law governing any judicial
proceeding. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is determined by the
agreement of the parties; it may decide only the questions submitted
to it. The tribunal must decide under the rules of law applicable to it.
It must conduct its proceedings in a judicial manner and with due
observance of the fundamental rules of procedure.1 2
Thus, in its notice of January 18, 1985, the United States was not in-
venting, but invoking, a recognized legal doctrine inherent in the very notion
of an international tribunal. Before rushing to condemn the United States
for its notice of withdrawal, the reader may find it appropriate to examine,
in terms of that classic theory, the Judgment that precipitated it.
II.
Fourteen of the 16 judges sitting in Nicaragua found that the Court had
jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Republic of Nica-
ragua on 9 April 1984, insofar as that Application relates to a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and the Republic of Nicaragua signed at Managua on 21 January 1956
on the basis of Article XXIV of that treaty."
Article XXIV(2) of the FCN Treaty provides: "Any dispute between the
Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty not
satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International
Court of Justice unless the Parties agree to settlement by some other specific
means."14 One of the judges who dissented from the Court's holding on
this ground found that there had been no negotiations.'" The majority,
for some reason not apparent on the face of the Judgment, ignored Article
XXI(1)(d) of the Treaty, which provides: "The present Treaty shall not
preclude the application of measures: . . .(d) necessary to fulfill the obli-
gations of a Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace
and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests.... "16 In the
face of such explicit language, it is difficult to see how any tribunal could
Art. 30, id. 12 Id.
s 1984 ICJ RPa. at 442, para. 113. 14 Id. at 427, para. 81.
15Separate Opinion of Judge Ruda, id. at 452, 454, para. 12.
6 Emphasis added. Judge Nagendra Singh was able to dispel for himself any lingering disquiet
on this point by finding significance in the fact "that the jurisdictional clause of Article XXIV
of the Treaty does not specify the exclusion of Article XXI from the Court's jurisdiction."
Separate Opinion ofJudge Nagendra Singh, id. at 444, 446-47.
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use the Treaty to subject to its own jurisdiction matters that had been ex-
pressly excluded.
A smaller, but still substantial, majority of 11 judges concluded that the
jurisdictional requirements of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International
Court ofJustice were fulfilled by the interlocking and sufficiently congruent
Declarations of Nicaragua and the United States.' 7 Nicaragua, in 1929, had
submitted a communication that was the first step in making a unilateral
declaration of unconditional submission to the jurisdiction of the Court when
it signed the Protocol. But it never submitted the requisite ratification, despite
the fact that it was duly notified that this deficiency rendered its effort at
making a declaration nugatory.' s Indeed, Nicaragua itself seems to have
been aware of the problem, for it had not relied on that stillborn commu-
nication in its own adjudication with Honduras in the International Court
in 1960, preferring instead a special agreement under Statute Article 36(1).'"
Yet the Court found that the incomplete communication of 1929 had
been completed, repaired and transformed into a declaration by virtue of
Article 36(5) of the Statute of the International Court. 20 That provision 21
had been designed to transfer to the new Court declarations that had been
made with regard to the Permanent Court of International Justice and that
were still in force. The majority of 11 judges accomplished this feat by
characterizing the 1929 communication (which could not, under the terms
of the instrument with regard to which it was submitted, be a declaration)
as a "declaration 22 and by concluding that this "declaration" was valid but
not binding. They then interpreted Article 36(5) as having been designed
to transform and render binding such theretofore uncompleted and defective
"declarations. '" 23
In fact, the legislative history of the Court's Statute indicates unmistakably
that this was not the intention of the transitional regime created by Article
36(5). The subcommittee of the Committee of Jurists, meeting in Washington
in 1945, was quite explicit: "The subcommittee calls attention to the fact
that many nations have heretofore accepted compulsory jurisdiction under
the 'optional clause'. The subcommittee believes that provision should be
1 Id. at 442, para. 113. 18 Id. at 403-04, para. 25.
19 Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906
(Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 ICJ REP. 192 (Judgment of Nov. 18).
20 1984 ICJ REP. at 404-08, paras. 27-35.
21 Article 36(5) provides:
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present
Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.
22 1984 ICJ REP. at 403-04, para. 25.
23 Id. at 405-08, paras. 29-35. For confirmation of its interpretation, the Court relied on
the "conduct" of international organizations (id. at 408-09, para. 36). For an examination of
the fallacy in this reasoning, and its implications, see M. Reisman, Dissemination of Information
by International Organizations: Reflections on Law and Policy in the Light of Recent Developments, VICT.
U. WELLINGTON L.J. (forthcoming).
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made at the San Francisco Conference for a special agreement for continuing
these acceptances in force for the purpose of this Statute. 24
A majority of 11 on the Court found that the 6-month clause present in
the U.S. Declaration, but absent in the now validated Nicaraguan one, bound
the United States and defeated its efforts to terminate or modify its Decla-
ration with immediate effect. 25 As for the restriction in the U.S. Declaration
of matters coming under multilateral treaties, the Court dismissed it on the
ground that even though the claims of Nicaragua may now have been en-
shrined in the texts of conventions, they originally derived from customary
and general international law. 26 Some of these latter findings, while certain
to generate scholarly and policy dispute, are not inconsistent with prior
jurisprudence. Others are very problematic. But the Court's creation of a
valid Nicaraguan declaration is so ill-founded in the facts, in the law and in
the Court's own jurisprudence as to constitute a ground of nullity. In inter-
national law, as elsewhere, it takes two to tango. Hence, even if the Court
could properly find that an appropriate U.S. declaration was in force, it
should still have found itself without jurisdiction in this case.
All of the judges rejected the United States arguments of admissibility.27
In a fragile international political system that seeks to protect itself by in-
sulating matters of vital interest to the major powers from review even by the
Security Council, it is arguable, of course, that those very states which sought
such insulation may still submit themselves to a decisional entity that has no
special mechanisms for protecting their interests. But surely a prudent tri-
bunal would look for a high degree of clarity in the waiver of those very
rights which international law has vouchsafed them. It is not the finding of
admissibility of issues in abstracto in this case that is puzzling, but its finding
when all of the other grounds of jurisdiction are so tenuous and forced.
Nor was this case free from some disquieting procedural pathologies. El
Salvador, which had sought to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute,
was denied that option by the Court. The decision itself tells us little.28 More
significant is the fact that El Salvador was denied a hearing on the matter. 29
The Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, on which 14 judges
relied to find jurisdiction, had not been invoked by Nicaragua in its original
Application and was scarcely discussed during the oral proceedings. Indeed,
Judge Oda, in his separate opinion, remarked that there was but a single
reference to it by the Agent of Nicaragua as "a subsidiary basis for the
2 4 Doc. Jurist 41, G/31, 14 UNCIO Docs. 289 (1945) (emphasis added), cited in Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Schwebel, 1984 ICJ REP. at 558, 571, para. 18, and Separate Opinion of
JudgeJennings, id. at 533, 536.
25 1984 ICJ REP. at 421, para. 65. 261 d. at 424, para. 73.
27 Id. at 429-41, paras. 84-108.
21 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Declaration
of Intervention, 1984 ICJ REP. 215 (Order of Oct. 4).29 See Separate Opinion of Judges Ruda, Mosler, Ago, Jennings and de Lacharri~re, id. at
219.
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Court's jurisdiction."3 ° The "unduly short time" allowed the judges to pre-
pare and expand separate and dissenting opinions was also noted."' The
unusual haste was particularly puzzling, as interim measures, largely accom-
plishing the basic remedy sought by the applicant, had already been ordered
against the defendant.32
Even a review as summary as this indicates that the United States grievance
that the Court's finding of its jurisdiction "is contrary to law and fact" was
far from implausible.
III.
Whatever one's views of the merits of the political controversy dividing
the United States and Nicaragua, it is well to remember that the International
Court must continue to operate after this dispute is resolved and Military
and Paramilitary Activities slips deeper and deeper into the lengthening crim-
son queue of ICJ Reports. In this longer view, one criterion of appraisal of
each of the Court's judgments and opinions is its constitutive impact on the
international judicial function itself,33 a ubiquitous and inescapable consid-
eration that is only sometimes treated explicitly.3 4 The performance of that
function depends on the confidence of states; the loss of that confidence
poses the gravest threat to this institution. The point has never been put
better than in Chief Justice White's dictum:
Discretion or compromise or adjustment, however cogent might be
the reasons which would lead the mind beyond the domain of rightful
power, and however much they might control if excess of authority
could be indulged in, can find no place in the discharge of the duty to
arbitrate a matter in dispute according to the submission and to go no
further. No more fatal blow could be struck at the possibility of arbi-
tration for adjusting international disputes than to take from the sub-
mission of such disputes the element of security arising from the re-
strictions just indicated.3 5
Fidelity to procedures is an important communication to states in this
regard, for, as Judge Koretsky put it, in international adjudication, they are
not "simply technical.. . .Their strict observance in the International Court
ofJustice. . .is even more important than in national courts."3 6 It is difficult
S"Judgment of Nov. 26, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, "Opening Remarks," 1984 ICJ
REP. at 471, 472.
s' E.g., by Judge Oda, id.
s Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures, 1984 ICJ REP. 169 (Order of May 10). See, in this regard, Reisman, Accelerating
Advisory Opinions: Critique and Proposal, 68 AJIL 648 (1974).
33 W. M. REISMAN, supra note 4, at 861.
"' Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. UK), Preliminary Objections,
1963 ICJ REP. 15, 65 (sep. op. Spender, J.) and 97 (sep. op. Fitzmaurice, J.) (Judgment of
Dec. 2).
35 1914 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1000, 1014, cited in K. CARLSTON,
supra note 4, at 64.
"' Northern Cameroons, Declaration of Judge Koretsky, 1963 ICJ REP. at 39, 40.
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to avoid the impression that in the Judgment of the Court of November 26,
1984, its image of probity and its record of fidelity to the intentions of those
states which have entrusted to it a general commitment to adjudicate were
seriously injured.
The political and human impulse to get involved in a controversy like
this is understandable. But before yielding to it, one would do well to reflect
again on the words of Secretary of State Root, instructing the American
delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907, at the very dawn of modern
international adjudication:
There can be no doubt that the principal objection to arbitration rests
not upon the unwillingness of nations to submit their controversies to
impartial arbitration, but upon an apprehension that the arbitrations
to which'they submit may not be impartial. It has been a very general
practice for arbitrators to act, not as judges deciding questions of fact
and law upon the record before them under a sense of judicial respon-
sibility, but as negotiators effecting settlements of the questions brought
before them in accordance with the traditions and usages and subject
to all the considerations and influences which affect diplomatic agents.
The two methods are radically different, proceed upon different stan-
dards of honorable obligation, and frequently lead to widely differing
results. It very frequently happens that a nation that would be very
willing to submit its differences to an impartial judicial determination
is unwilling to subject them to this kind of diplomatic process. 37
The United States, by its withdrawal ofJanuary 18, 1985, has not helped
the Court. Nor will the Court be helped by the termination of the United
States Declaration and probable emendation of the declarations of other
states, now made necessary by the novel and expansive jurisprudence implicit
in theJudgment of November 26, 1984. But before condemning the United
States for what appears to be a retreat from international adjudication and
before greater injury is done to international adjudication, international
lawyers might do well to read the Judgment again in the light of the classic
theory of public international jurisdiction. For it is an affirmation and not
a repudiation of law to reject a decision by a tribunal that had nojurisdiction
to make such a decision.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN
s Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference, May 31, 1907, 1907
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 2, at 1128, 1135.
* I acknowledge with gratitude the critical comments and suggestions of my colleague Myres
S. McDougal.
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